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Automated theorem proving essentially amounts to solving search problems. Despite
significant progress in recent years theorem provers still have many shortcomings. The
use of machine-learning techniques such as schemas is acknowledged as promising, but
difficult to apply in the area of theorem proving. We propose a simple form of schemas,
and to make use of a schema heuristically by integrating it with a search-guiding heuris-
tic. Experiments have demonstrated that the approach allows a theorem prover to find
proofs significantly faster and to prove hard problems that were out of reach before.
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1. Introduction
Automated theorem proving in first- and higher-order logics is a central area of artificial
intelligence (AI). It is the hub of important applications of AI such as program verification
or program synthesis. An automated theorem prover (ATP) essentially conducts a search
in a search space which is in general infinite. Powerful search-guiding heuristics and
sophisticated implementation techniques account for a strong performance of state-of-the-
art ATPs. However, ATPs still have many shortcomings and weaknesses that seriously
limit their usefulness.
The main reasons for this drawback are the vastness of the search space and rather
poor knowledge on its structure. There are various methods on the calculus level which
aim at pruning the search space by avoiding certain inferences in certain situations (e.g.
ordered resolution or equational theorem proving based on the Knuth–Bendix completion
procedure). None the less the search space in general remains infinite. Moreover, pruning
the search space does not necessarily speed up the search for proofs.
It is widely acknowledged that exploiting proof experience (learning) can be very prof-
itable and alleviate shortcomings of ATPs. Various concepts of schemas play a pivotal
role in the learning process. The purpose of a schema is to capture essential aspects of a
proof so that it can be reused in order to facilitate proofs to come. When using schemas
it is instrumental to choose an appropriate design. In other words, the knowledge rep-
resented by a schema must be encoded suitably. Immediately connected and interleaved
with this issue is the crucial question of how a schema is to be utilized to produce proofs.
Selection is the third component that plays a fundamental role in the use of schemas. It
deals with the problem of which schema to use so as to solve a given proof task. Conse-
quently, selection has to find a way to measure or estimate the similarity between proof
problems in order to suggest or retrieve useful schemas.
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Hence, when using schemas, three problems must be addressed, namely design, usage,
and selection of schemas. In particular, design and usage strongly depend on the kind of
ATP being employed. We chose bottom-up first-order theorem proving as the principle
working method of an ATP. The basics of bottom-up theorem proving and schema design
in this context will be introduced in Section 2. The design of a schema we propose here
is fairly simple. Essentially, a schema is the set of formulas constituting a proof. The
usage of schemas will be done heuristically, meaning that a schema is integrated with
a search-guiding heuristic to create a search bias that allows the ATP to quickly find
proofs of problems that are related to the one the schema stems from. The reasons for a
heuristic use of schemas and technical details will be discussed in Section 3. Selection and
the design of a suitable similarity measure will be explained in Section 4. A number of
experiments reported in Section 5 demonstrate the potential of the approach by showing
that the performance of an ATP can be enhanced, resulting in significant speed-ups and
even successful proofs where no proof could be found before in an acceptable period of
time. Finally, a discussion in Section 6 concludes this article.
2. Schema Design
Schema design is concerned with the central task of how knowledge from previous ex-
perience, resulting from proof runs, can be harnessed, encoded, and made available for
future schema usage. The type of ATP we are employing plays a pivotal role. Forward
reasoning or bottom-up theorem proving is a well-known and well-studied type of theo-
rem proving that is utilized by ATPs based on the resolution method (e.g. Chang and
Lee, 1973) or the Knuth–Bendix completion procedure (e.g. Bachmair et al., 1989). The
principle working method of such an ATP is to infer formulas which here we simply call
facts (e.g. first-order clauses or equations construed with the help of a set of variables
and a finite set of function symbols). Facts are inferred by applying given inference rules,
starting with a given set Ax of axioms, until the goal λG (the theorem to be proved)
can be shown to be a logical consequence of Ax. A proof problem A is hence specified by
A = (Ax, λG).
The forward-reasoning process or the continuous derivation of logical consequences is
typically automated in the following way (cp. Figure 1): the prover maintains two sets
of facts, the set FA of active facts and the set FP of passive or potential facts. Facts
in FA have actually been inferred, whereas facts in FP are inferable from FA, but are
not considered actually inferred. In the beginning, FA = ∅ and FP = Ax. (Hence we
assume the view that axioms can be inferred from any, in particular the empty, set.)
In the selection or activation step a fact λ ∈ FP is selected, removed from FP , and
put into FA, unless there is a fact λ′ ∈ FA that subsumes λ (in symbols λ′  λ), in
which case λ is simply discarded. This type of subsumption is referred to as forward
subsumption.† Discarding a λ′ ∈ FA because λ  λ′ for a λ ∈ FP just selected is called
backward subsumption. It may be employed to prune the search space, but is not necessary
to obtain a working ATP. Note that syntactic identity of λ and λ′ (modulo renaming
variables) implies λ′  λ and of course λ λ′. If λ is indeed activated (put into FA), all
finitely many inferences involving λ and other facts in FA are applied exhaustively, and
inferred facts are added to FP .
†In most calculi there is a clear notion of subsumption, but it needs to be specifically defined for a
calculus at hand.
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Figure 1. Principle working method of an ATP based on bottom-up reasoning.
This procedure stops if a fact λ is activated which subsumes the goal λG. In this case
a proof was found and the search terminates successfully. The procedure may also stop
because the set FP of potential facts is empty. If this happens, then there is no proof,
i.e. λG is not a logical consequence of Ax. Otherwise, in particular if there is no proof
and FP never becomes empty, the procedure does not terminate at all.
The forward-reasoning type of proof procedure just sketched can be transformed into
a refutational proof procedure with minor modifications. Instead of FP = Ax we use
FP = Ax ∪ {¬λG}, where ¬λG denotes the negation of the goal. The proof procedure
then proceeds as described above and stops as soon as the inconsistency of Ax ∪ {¬λG}
becomes obvious, for instance by inferring or activating the empty clause “2”.
The activation step is the only inherently indeterministic step in the proof procedure
just sketched. Commonly, a heuristic H is employed to resolve the non-determinism at
the inevitable expense of introducing search. H associates a natural number H(λ) ∈ N,
which is called a weight , with each λ ∈ FP . The fact with the smallest weight H(λ) is
next in line for activation. Ties are usually broken in compliance with the first in, first out
(FIFO) strategy. Theoretically, FIFO cannot be applied to axioms. In practice, however,
when “loading” FP with the axioms from Ax, some order is imposed on Ax which is
used as FIFO information. Naturally, this order affects the search. By employing a total
ordering on facts or fixed given problem specifications—e.g. problem specifications as they
are given in the TPTP problem library (“Thousands of Problems for Theorem Provers”
designed by Sutcliffe et al. (1994)), which is what we have done here—ambiguities with
respect to the initial load-up phase can be avoided.
The heuristicH is crucial for the performance of an ATP. Section 1 pointed out that our
approach is to make use of a schema heuristically (see also Section 3). Therefore, schema
design should centre on essential aspects of the heuristic search. The search behaviour
of H is characterized by the sequence of facts activated during the search, omitting those
facts that are discarded due to forward subsumption. This sequence of facts is called a
search protocol and is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. (Search Protocol) LetH be a heuristic, and A be a proof problem.
Furthermore, let SH,A = ε be an empty sequence or list of facts. When searching for a
proof of A using H, at each activation step, the fact λ selected by H is appended to SH,A
if λ is not subsumed by a λ′ ∈ FA. In the case that a proof is eventually found, the finite
sequence SH,A ≡ λ1; . . . ;λn obtained this way is called a search protocol (with respect
to H and A). The last fact λn of the search protocol concludes the proof. We may write
S instead of SH,A if H and A are immaterial or derive from context.
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Figure 2. Illustration of heuristic usage of a schema P in an ATP based on bottom-up reasoning.
We assume that a justification J i is associated with each λi occurring in a search pro-
tocol S.
Definition 2.2. (Justification) Let H be a heuristic, and A = (Ax, λG) be a proof
problem such that the search for a proof of A guided by H eventually produces a proof.
Let SH,A ≡ λ1; . . . ;λn be the respective search protocol. For each λi in SH,A, there is a
justification J i which is the set of immediate ancestors of λi with respect to the inference
rule applied to obtain λi.
Consequently, we have J i = ∅ if λi ∈ Ax. If λi /∈ Ax, we have J i = {λi1 , . . . , λik}, ij < i
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. That is, ancestors occur before descendants, and there is an inference
rule that can produce λi when applied to λi1 , . . . , λik .
The search protocol SH,A records all the facts activated by H. Not all of these facts
are necessary to produce the proof of A eventually found. As a matter of fact, for most
non-trivial proof problems the majority of facts in SH,A ≡ λ1; . . . ;λn do not play a role
in the proof. Recalling that the last fact λn in SH,A concludes the proof, the facts that
contributed to deducing λn can be identified by tracing back the applications of inference
rules starting with λn. These facts including λn are collected in the set PH,A or P for
short. P can be considered to be a proof although, on the one hand, a proof usually is
a more structured and detailed presentation of a reasoning process. On the other hand,
P contains those facts that need to be selected in order to find a proof of A without
incurring any redundant search effort in terms of activation steps that eventually do not
contribute to the proof. (Here, we are only interested in the proof of A we have. However,
a fact which does not play a role in this proof of A may none the less be a part of some
other proof of A.) Thus, in view of the intended heuristic use of a schema as depicted by
Figure 2, the set P provides sufficiently detailed information. Therefore, in our approach
a schema is such a set P, and we shall henceforth use the notions “schema P” and
“(source) proof P” synonymously.
Definition 2.3. (Schema) Let A be a proof problem and let SH,A ≡ λ1; . . . ;λn be a
search protocol with respect to A obtained when using a heuristic H. Recall that λn
concludes the proof of A (cf. Definition 2.1). We may view SH,A as a set rather than a
list of facts. A schema of A is a set PH,A = Pq of facts, where q ∈ N is the smallest index
satisfying Pq = Pq+1 and Pi is given by
P0 = {λn}
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Pi+1 = Pi ∪
⋃
λj∈Pi
J j , i ≥ 0.
J j is the justification for, i.e. the set of immediate ancestors of, fact λj . See Definition 2.2.
We may write PA instead of PH,A if H is immaterial. We may write P if both H and A
are immaterial or derive from context.
The computation of Pi realizes the terminating process of proof extraction. Note that
recording a search protocol S and extracting the proof P from S is not difficult in con-
nection with resolution-based theorem proving, but more effort is required for equational
theorem proving (Denzinger and Schulz, 1996b).
In our approach a schema holds information on a single proof found in the past. Most
approaches to learning and schemas are based on utilizing just one proof at a time. We
are aware of only one method (Denzinger and Schulz, 1996a) that is explicitly designed
to exploit several proofs. A proof found in the past will henceforth be referred to as a
source proof and the respective proof problem as the source problem. A proof problem
which we seek to solve will be called a target problem and its as yet unknown solution
will be called a target proof .
The semantics of a schema P as defined in Definition 2.3 is determined by the way a
heuristic H makes use of P (see also Figure 2). This issue, as it is resolved here, will be
covered in detail in the following section. Informally speaking, a schema P provides H
with “clues” that help to direct the search in a promising direction. In other words, P is
a kind of “blueprint” of a successful search that H can exploit in some way to facilitate
the solution of new problems.
3. Schema Usage
There are two main lines of research concerned with the application of machine-learning
techniques, including schemas, to theorem proving. These two lines can be characterized
as “analogical reasoning” and “learning heuristics”. Analogical reasoning or analogy-
based proof transformation attempts to transform a source proof into a target proof of a
novel problem based on analogies detected between the specifications of the source and
target problem (Brock et al., 1988; Owen, 1990; Kolbe and Walther, 1994; Melis, 1995).
The transformation procedures typically try to avoid search. Failures of the transforma-
tion process can be cushioned to a certain extent using recovery (Brock et al., 1988) or
patching (Kolbe and Walther, 1995) mechanisms. However, the sensitivity of a proof to
petty variations of the problem specification severely hampers and restricts the useful-
ness of these methods. They are therefore mainly employed in connection with inductive
theorem proving where the inherent proof structure provides a suitable platform.
Approaches centring on learning heuristics attempt to create improved search-guiding
heuristics (Suttner and Ertel, 1990; Fuchs, 1995; Denzinger and Schulz, 1996a; Fuchs,
1996a, 1997a,b,c, 1998; Fuchs and Fuchs, 1998). That is, the ATP still conducts a search,
but the search is guided by a learned heuristic which, in some way, exploits experiences
made in previous successful runs of the ATP. In other words, learning creates a search
bias which directs the search into regions of the search space that appear to be more
profitable according to past experience.
This approach has several advantages. First of all, a learned heuristic can be used like
any other heuristic. Hence, there is no need for creating new systems or even for ma-
jor modifications of existing ones if learned heuristics are to be employed. Furthermore,
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the approach is able to handle vague knowledge much better than analogy-based meth-
ods can. This ability, which is crucial for learning in connection with theorem proving,
originates from conducting a search as opposed to executing a possibly deterministic
transformation process. In particular, we do not need explicit sophisticated patching
strategies that attempt to recover from failures on account of fatal differences between
source and target, so to speak “breakdowns in analogy” (cp. Brock et al., 1988). The
search process can compensate for deviations to a certain extent and thus can provide
implicit “patching”. An immediate consequence of this property is that a smaller degree
of similarity is required so that a source problem or schema is actually helpful for proving
a target problem (cf. Section 4). This accounts for a larger range of applicability.
In the following, we shall present a method for schema usage that produces an im-
proved search-guiding heuristic with the help of a schema P obtained as described in
Section 2. The method is called flexible re-enactment (fr) and was first introduced by
Fuchs (1996a). (See also Fuchs (1997b).) Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 explain the basics and
technical details of fr, respectively. Subsection 3.3 discusses the most prominent prop-
erties of fr.
3.1. basics of flexible re-enactment
A frequent observation when proving in particular in some way related problems is
that there is a considerable number of facts which play a role in many proofs. In other
words, proofs of related problems “share” many facts. Relatedness is a pivotal issue here
that is hard to estimate a priori. It will be discussed in the context of schema selection in
Section 4. Based on this observation, the following heuristic use of a schema P originating
from a source problem AS = (AxS , λS) in order to prove a (related) target problem
AT = (AxT , λT ) appears to be profitable.
During the search for a proof of AT , a fact λ that is also a part of the schema P is
activated as soon as it appears in the set FP of potential facts maintained for the target
proof search. A search-guiding heuristic with this search bias will re-enact P if this is
possible. If AxT = AxS , then re-enactment is definitely possible. Otherwise, a partial re-
enactment or a full, but delayed re-enactment can be possible. Re-enactment essentially
means that the heuristic will preferably activate facts that are in P and thus establish a
good starting point for continuing the search for a target proof.
A first generalization of this principle is to prefer a λ ∈ FP not only if λ ∈ P, but also
if it is more general than a fact in P. A fact λ ∈ FP with these properties is called a
focus fact . As before in Section 2, “” denotes subsumption.
Definition 3.1. (Focus Fact) Let P be a schema. A fact λ is called a focus fact with
respect to schema P if ∃λ′ ∈ P : λ λ′.
A heuristic utilizing a schema P by giving small weights to focus facts (w.r.t. P) will
perform re-enactment as described above. However, classifying facts as focus and non-
focus facts is a restrictive approach that does not fully exploit the potential of a schema P.
While re-enactment can provide a solid basis for further search, this continuing search
can still be supported by P. The idea is to “extend” or “search in the vicinity” of the
respective re-enacted fragment of P.
The terms or metaphors “extension” and “search in the vicinity” can be best under-
stood when viewing a proof as a directed graph with nodes corresponding to facts and
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vertices representing applications of inference rules, pointing from ancestors to descen-
dants. With this picture in mind, “extension” refers to adding new nodes (i.e. facts) and
the respective vertices, and “search in the vicinity” means that preferably nodes should
be added so that the length of a path from a node of the “original” graph, representing
the re-enacted part of a proof, to a new node is small.
To this end, the descendants of focus facts—which are not focus facts themselves—
also receive smaller weights that depend on their “relationship” with focus facts. This
relationship essentially measures the number of inferences that separate focus facts from
their non-focus fact descendants. For example, an immediate descendant of focus facts
is most closely related, whereas the degree of relationship is lesser if non-focus facts are
among the (immediate) ancestors.
The re-enactment capabilities paired with the flexibility arising from the gradual proof
extension led to the name flexible re-enactment (fr) for the heuristic that utilizes a
schema as outlined above. The following subsection presents the technical details of fr.
3.2. details of flexible re-enactment
For the definition of fr the notions “difference” and “distance” are pivotal. First, we
define the difference diff between two facts λ and λ′ to make the notion “focus fact”
tangible for computing heuristic weights in compliance with Definition 3.1.
diff(λ, λ′) =
{
0, λ λ′
100, otherwise.
Note that the values 0 and 100 are somewhat arbitrary but intuitive hints of percentages,
denoting “perfect similarity” and “no similarity at all”, respectively. As we shall see, the
restriction of diff to N100 = {0, 1, . . . , 100} entails that all further computations will
produce values from N100 which makes computations more transparent.
diff is used to find out whether or not a given fact λ is a focus fact with respect to a
schema P. We define
DP(λ) = min({diff(λ, λ′) | λ′ ∈ P}) .
Hence, DP(λ) returns the minimal difference between a given fact λ and the facts of a
schema P. If DP(λ) = 0 then λ is considered to be a focus fact, which complies with
Definition 3.1. Note that for the given definition of diff we have DP(λ) ∈ {0, 100}.
Subsection 3.1 explained why we also want to favour descendants of focus facts. The
preference given to them, however, should be lesser than the preference given to actual
focus facts and should decrease as their relationship to focus facts becomes more and
more remote. To this end we introduce the distance distP(λ) of a given fact λ from
focus facts with respect to schema P. Roughly stated, distP(λ) measures distance or
“relationship” in terms of the number of inference steps separating λ from ancestors
which are focus facts. It depends on the distance of the immediate ancestors of λ from
focus facts if λ is not an axiom, and DP(λ) which indicates whether or not λ is actually
a focus fact itself.
distP(λ) =

ψ(q,DP(λ)), if λ is an axiom
ψ(distP(λ1),DP(λ)), if λ1 is the only immediate
ancestor of λ
ψ(γ(distP(λ1),distP(λ2)),DP(λ)), if λ1 and λ2 are the immediate
ancestors of λ.
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distP(λ) makes use of an auxiliary function ψ : N1002 → N100 to combine information
regarding the distance of the immediate ancestors of λ and DP(λ). The first argument
of ψ represents the distance of the immediate ancestors. It is simply given as the distance
of the immediate ancestor if there is just one immediate ancestor. If λ is an axiom (i.e.
there are no ancestors), this value is specified by a parameter q ∈ N100. If λ has two
immediate ancestors, then a further auxiliary function γ : N1002 → N100 computes this
value. Note that distP(λ) is defined if λ has zero, one, or two immediate ancestors which
is mostly sufficient. If the number of immediate ancestors should be in excess of two,
then a weighted average of the ancestors’ distances can be employed, for instance. We
chose a parametrized γ employing a parameter q1 ∈ [0; 1]. Depending on q1, the result
of γ ranges between the minimum and the maximum of the distances of the immediate
ancestors:
γ(x, y) = min(x, y) + bq1 · (max(x, y)−min(x, y))c.
Using q1 = 0 or q1 = 1, γ computes the minimum or maximum, respectively. With
q1 = 0.5, γ computes the integer part† of the average.
As outlined above, ψ combines the distances of immediate ancestors, or q if there
are no immediate ancestors, and DP yielding distP(λ). In order to comply with the
principles outlined above, namely the preference of focus facts and the preference of
their descendants that decreases with their remoteness from focus facts, ψ should satisfy
the following criteria: on the one hand, distP(λ) should be minimal (i.e. 0) if DP(λ) = 0,
in which case λ itself is a focus fact. On the other hand, the value produced by ψ should
increase reasonably with the values obtained from γ and DP in order to reflect the
growing remoteness of λ from focus facts and, in a way, from the schema at hand. As a
matter of fact, γ already satisfies the latter criterion. Therefore, ψ is in parts identical
to γ. It also uses a parameter q2 ∈ [0; 1].
ψ(x, y) =
{
0, y = 0
min(x, y) + bq2 · (max(x, y)−min(x, y))c, otherwise.
Consequently, we have distP(λ) = 0 if λ is a focus fact with respect to schema P.
The remaining task consists in designing fr so that it offers a reasonable degree of
specialization in, or a focus on, the schema P that is paired with an acceptable degree of
flexibility, i.e. the ability to cope with a target problem with a proof that requires minor
to moderate deviations from P. The use of distP already provides sufficient specialization
by directing the search towards the schema. Its rudimentary flexibility can be enhanced
by combining it with some “standard” or “conventional” (“general-purpose”) heuristicH.
Among several sensible alternatives we picked the following:
Definition 3.2. (Heuristic fr) Let λ be a fact, and let H be a search-guiding heuris-
tic that requires no further information besides λ to compute a weightH(λ) of λ. Further-
more, let P be a schema and p ∈ N. The search-guiding heuristic frP utilizing schema P
is defined by
frP(λ) = (distP(λ) + p) · H(λ).
The parameter p controls the effect of distP(λ) on the final weight frP(λ). distP(λ) will
†We restrict our computations to N, because there is no gain in “high precision arithmetic” when
dealing with weighting functions, but there would be a loss in efficiency w.r.t. computation time.
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be dominant if p = 0. In this case, if distP(λ) = 0, frP(λ) will also be 0 regardless
of H(λ). As p grows, H increasingly influences the final weight, thus mitigating the
inflexibility of the underlying method, namely using distP(λ) alone as a measure for the
suitability of a fact λ. For very large p, the influence of distP(λ) becomes negligible, and
frP basically degenerates into H.
Besides the parameter P which indicates the schema to be used, frP also has the
numerical parameters p ∈ N, q ∈ N100, and q1, q2 ∈ [0; 1]. We do not include the latter
parameters in the notation mainly to enhance readability. Apart from that, the param-
eters p, q, q1, and q2 will remain untouched once they are set to appropriate values (cp.
Section 5.1). Consequently, the only parameter that will make a difference regarding the
application of fr is the schema P. Thus, the machine-learning aspect of fr mainly resides
in the utilization of previous experience in the form of a schema. (See also Section 6 in
this context.)
3.3. properties of flexible re-enactment
fr is most suitable in situations where each source axiom is “covered” by a target
axiom, i.e. for each source axiom λ′ ∈ AxS there is a target axiom λ ∈ AxT so that λλ′.
Then frP can conduct a search guided by the schema or source proof P in the sense that
frP can re-enact the source proof or a more general proof without incurring significant
search effort, depending on the values chosen for the parameters q1, q2, and in particular p.
The fully re-enacted source proof or, more precisely, the focus facts representing the
source proof, can serve as a basis for finding the target proof. If additionally the source
goal λS subsumes the target goal λT , then plain re-enactment will succeed.
Under these conditions it is possible to add the schema facts in P to the target ax-
iomatization as lemmas, because every logical consequence of the source axioms is also
a logical consequence of the target axioms. Therefore, fr has often been mistaken for
a costly disguise for adding lemmas. However, adding lemmas creates kind of a “flat”
structure as opposed to a more hierarchical structure when using focus facts and the
notion of distance. In other words, when simply adding lemmas we have an enlarged set
of axioms on the one side and their descendants on the other side. fr, however, imposes
a kind of ordering on descendants, essentially giving immediate descendants top prior-
ity. The breadth-first search among descendants induced by distP can none the less be
transformed into a heuristic search, controlled by H depending on the value chosen for p.
fr is also useful in case source and target axiomatizations do not agree “obviously”,
i.e. agreement in terms of logical equivalence cannot be checked with simple syntactic
subsumption criteria. Under these conditions it is not sound to add the schema facts
to the target axiomatization because it is not known whether or not they are logical
consequences of the target axiomatization. In Section 5 we shall see that fr performs
quite well when target and source axiomatizations do not agree obviously, regardless of
whether or not target and source goal agree (i.e. λS  λT ).
Thus, fr is very versatile and covers a wide range of applicability. Nevertheless we
want to point out that fr does of course not prove useful if source and target problem
are not “similar enough”, i.e. hardly any of the focus facts play a role in any target proof.
In other words, there are too few relevant focus facts that do not suffice to supply the
core of a target proof. In addition, too many irrelevant focus facts hamper or mislead the
search. Naturally, relevant and irrelevant focus facts can only be identified at the end of
a successful search. In this case focusing on the source proof will be counterproductive.
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Hence it is important to find a suitable source problem and thus a profitable schema P.
This difficulty will be addressed in the following section.
4. Schema Selection
Selecting an appropriate schema to solve a given target problem is a crucial step in
every schema-based approach. This step essentially amounts to finding a source problem
that is most similar to the target problem among all available source problems and then
selecting the associated schema. For methods that utilize several source problems the
degree of difficulty of this task may be quite low, but for approaches that centre on a single
source problem a suitable notion of similarity is an important issue. As usual, there is a
trade-off between the range and ease of application and the gains that can be expected.
On the one hand, the method described by Denzinger and Schulz (1996a) can be applied
to a wide variety of target problems without major difficulties regarding the choice of
source problems. On the other hand, the gains with respect to performance improvements
generally are lesser compared to approaches that make use of a single source problem
because the latter use more specific knowledge. This, however, necessitates sophisticated
techniques to identify suitable knowledge that is actually applicable in a specific context.
Hence, similarity is an important topic for learning methods that need to select a cer-
tain piece of knowledge—namely a single source problem or schema—from a potentially
large database. Since the transformation process of analogy-based methods critically de-
pends on a sufficiently similar source problem, similarity is a central and clearly defined
notion for these methods. Similarity may even be used to determine whether or not the
source proof can be transformed into a target proof. That is, in this case, similarity is a
predicate that, if true, guarantees the success of the transformation process and, if false,
indicates that there is no point in using the respective source problem. Naturally, this
type of similarity is very restrictive. Being restrictive basically means that for many tar-
get problems there is no source problem available that can pass the stringent similarity
test. Many analogy-based methods, however, actually require such a stringent test.
For learning heuristics similarity is also important, but not as pivotal as for analogy-
based methods. It is necessary to detect a source problem AS which is “similar enough”
to a given target problem AT so that in this case fr can use the schema P stemming
from AS to find a target proof. “Similar enough” essentially means that the search bias
of frP is profitable for solving AT , which usually leaves a lot more elbow-room than,
for instance, a similarity requirement that is to guarantee the success of a deterministic
transformation procedure. Therefore, similarity in connection with learning heuristics is
more of an intuitive and heuristic nature. That is, it is less exact in the sense that there
are no guarantees for success nor failure, but it is also less restrictive, and it mainly
centres on heuristic similarity measures.
A similarity measure for proof problems should reflect the way in which schema usage
proceeds so that there is a good chance for the selected schema to be actually useful.
Here, the similarity measure has to select a source problem AS and thus a schema P so
that frP is a suitable search-guiding heuristic for proving a given target problem AT .
The fundamental idea of fr (cp. Subsection 3.1) is to fully or partially re-enact the
source proof (schema P) and then continue the search in its vicinity. In order to re-
enact a substantial part or all of the source proof when searching for a target proof, the
axiomatizations of AS and AT have to “agree” to a certain extent. More precisely, let
AS = (AxS , λS) and AT = (AxT , λT ). If all axioms in AxS also occur in AxT , possibly
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in a more general form, then full re-enactment is possible. The fewer axioms of AxS also
occur in AxT , the more we can expect a delayed full or merely partial re-enactment.
This similarity criterion can be called axiom coverage and is defined shortly. It slightly
refines the principle just outlined by considering only the subset of the source axioma-
tization AxS that was actually needed for the proof providing us with schema P. Note
that we assume here that source and target problems are specified using the same names
for function symbols, i.e. the same signature. If this is not the case, an arity-preserving
signature mapping must be found that transforms the source signature into the target
signature. If no such signature mapping exists, then the respective problems should be
considered inherently dissimilar, although more elaborate techniques involving second-
order matching may still be able to extract some useful information. If several such
mappings exist, the one that maximizes the similarity criteria to come should be chosen.
Definition 4.1. (Axiom Coverage) Let AS = (AxS , λS) and AT = (AxT , λT ) be a
source and target problem, respectively. Furthermore, let P be the schema originating
from the proof of AS at hand, and let Ax = AxS ∩ P. The similarity criterion axiom
coverage axcov with respect to AS and AT is defined by
axcov(AS ,AT ) = |{λ | λ ∈ Ax ∧ ∃λ
′ ∈ AxT : λ′  λ}|
|Ax| .
Besides axiom coverage, it is sensible to consider goal similarity as a further similarity
criterion, because if the source goal λS is identical to or even more general than the target
goal λT , then a full re-enactment of the source proof definitely yields a target proof.
Definition 4.2. (Goal Similarity) Let AS = (AxS , λS) and AT = (AxT , λT ) be a
source and target problem, respectively. The similarity criterion goal similarity gsim with
respect to AS and AT is defined by
gsim(AS ,AT ) =
{
1, λS  λT
0, otherwise.
Obviously, gsim is a very coarse similarity criterion that can and needs to be refined
depending on the calculus at hand. For this introductory presentation, however, we con-
tent ourselves with the above definition. Note that for both axcov and gsim bigger values
indicate a higher degree of similarity between the respective source and target problem.
The similarity criteria axiom coverage and goal similarity and possibly further similar-
ity criteria can be used to create a similarity measure sim for proof problems. Naturally,
there are many ways to achieve this. One possibility is to use a weighted sum.
Definition 4.3. (Similarity Measure) Let AS = (AxS , λS) and AT = (AxT , λT ) be
a source and target problem, respectively. Furthermore, let axcov and gsim be defined as
in Definitions 4.1 and 4.2, and let c1, c2 ∈ N. A similarity measure sim for AS and AT is
defined by
sim(AS ,AT ) = c1 · axcov(AS ,AT ) + c2 · gsim(AS ,AT ).
Hence we have sim(AS ,AT ) ∈ R and it is now fairly easy to define a minimal similarity
requirement by giving some threshold m ∈ R and only considering a source problem AS
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if sim(AS ,AT ) ≥ m. Furthermore, we can define what it means for one source prob-
lem A1 to be more similar to AT than some other source problem A2. This is the case
if sim(A1,AT ) > sim(A2,AT ).
The minimal similarity requirement and the possibility to compare similarity provide us
with the fundamental tools for determining a sufficiently and most similar source problem
for a given target problem. In case there are several most and sufficiently similar source
problems, further refinements of the similarity measure may be necessary. Note, however,
that due to the purely heuristic nature of the similarity measure, it does not necessarily
make sense to refine it to an extent where it is able to narrow down the choices to one.
Instead, it is reasonable to find suitable ways to cope with several alternative source
problems (Fuchs, 1997c; Fuchs and Fuchs, 1997a; Denzinger et al., 1997).
None the less, the following refinements appear to be sensible. In the case sim(A1,AT )=
sim(A2,AT ), the search protocols S1 and S2 associated with the successful searches for
proofs of A1 and A2, respectively, are utilized. A longer search protocol evidences a more
difficult search. A more difficult search is likely to produce a schema that conveys more
crucial information than a shorter and hence easier search. Therefore, we prefer A1 to A2
if |S1| > |S2| and sim(A1,AT ) = sim(A2,AT ).
Using the size of search protocols as a comparison criterion, however, is problematic if
a search protocol stems from a search conducted by frP with some schema P. frP may
find a proof of a target problem AT very quickly, which means that the resulting search
protocol will be short. Nevertheless, the schema PT that can be extracted from it must be
considered valuable since it in parts encompasses the knowledge contained by schema P
in the form of relevant focus facts that contribute to the proof of AT and thus to PT .
Moreover, the fact that AT was tackled with frP in practice often means that conven-
tional heuristics and possibly frP′ for some other schema P ′ failed, which is a further
indicator for the utility of PT . These considerations are taken into account by associating
a proof hierarchy level ζA with each solved problem A. Basically, ζA counts the number
of schemas that played a role in the bootstrapping process that led to a proof of A.
Definition 4.4. (Proof Hierarchy Level) Let A and B be two proof problems.
The proof hierarchy level ζA associated with A is defined as follows.
ζA = 0 if A was proved using a “conventional” heuristic.
ζA = ζB + 1 if A was proved using frPB , where PB is the schema originating from
a proof of B found in the past.
A “more similar than” ordering AT with respect to a target problem AT can now be
defined as follows.
Definition 4.5. (Ordering AT ) Let AT be a target problem, and let A1 and A2
be two source problems. Let ζ1, ζ2 and S1, S2 be the proof hierarchy levels and search
protocols associated with A1 and A2, respectively. Furthermore, let sim be the similarity
measure as defined by Definition 4.3. We have
A1ATA2 if and only if
sim(A1,AT ) > sim(A2,AT )
or
sim(A1,AT ) = sim(A2,AT ) ∧ ζ1 > ζ2
or
sim(A1,AT ) = sim(A2,AT ) ∧ ζ1 = ζ2 ∧ |S1| > |S2|.
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With the help of AT it will be possible to identify most similar source problems, i.e.
problems A for which there is no other available problem B such that BATA. The basic
concepts presented in this section will be put in concrete terms in the context of our
experimental studies in Subsection 5.3.
5. Experimental Studies
We conducted our experimental studies with a theorem prover for problems of con-
densed detachment (CD). Subsection 5.1 explains the basics of CD and motivates this
choice. Subsections 5.2 and 5.3 present our experimental results regarding schema usage
and schema selection, respectively.
5.1. condensed detachment
CD originates from substitution and detachment , and can be used to study logic calculi
with ATPs. (See Tarski (1956) and  Lukasiewicz (1970) for a detailed theoretical back-
ground.) There is only one inference rule, also denoted by CD, that manipulates first-order
terms which we shall also call facts. The set of terms (facts) Term(F ,V) is defined as
usual, involving a finite set F of function symbols and an enumerable set V of variables.
CD in its basic form is defined for a distinguished binary function symbol f ∈ F .
CD essentially is a generalized modus pones that allows us to deduce σ(t) from two
given facts f(s, t) and s′ if σ is the most general unifier of s and s′. A proof problem
A = (Ax, λG) hence consists in deducing λG, or a λ so that λ  λG, from Ax with
continuous applications of CD.
CD fits in with the bottom-up theorem proving framework given in Section 2. Sub-
sumption is merely a matching problem, i.e. λ  λ′ if and only if there is a match σ so
that σ(λ) ≡ λ′. Forward subsumption is applied to avoid the activation of facts which
are identical to, or instances of, facts activated earlier. Thus, forward subsumption is an
indispensable tool to increase efficiency by reducing redundancy. Search statistics demon-
strate that a huge percentage of facts about to be activated are immediately discarded on
account of forward subsumption. Backward subsumption, however, is not utilized, mainly
because it rarely occurs, and consequently the gains are negligible or non-existent in view
of the computational effort necessary to perform backward subsumption.
Despite the simplicity of CD the arising proof problems can be very hard, sometimes
even exceeding the limits of state-of-the-art provers. Therefore, CD is widely acknowledged
as a serious testing ground for new ideas. It has been and still is used for this purpose
quite frequently (e.g. Wos, 1990; McCune and Wos, 1992; Slaney, 1993; Wos, 1995; Fuchs,
1996a; Veroff, 1996). Furthermore, CD offers problems of a varying degree of difficulty,
almost continuously ranging from nearly trivial to very challenging. This constellation is
important if we want to employ learning techniques like fr.
For the experiments we used the theorem prover CoDe (Fuchs and Fuchs, 1997b)
that realizes CD based on the concepts introduced in Section 2. CoDe has a standard
heuristic Hˆ at its disposal that computes the weight Hˆcδ,cw(λ) of a fact λ ∈ FP as
Hˆcδ,cw(λ) = cδ ·δ(λ)+cw ·w(λ), cδ, cw ∈ N. w(λ) is equal to twice the number of function
symbols occurring in λ plus the number of variables in λ. δ(λ) is the level or depth of λ:
δ(λ) = 0 if λ is an axiom; otherwise δ(λ) is the maximum of the levels of the immediate
ancestors of λ plus 1. Furthermore, we set Hˆcδ,cw(λ) = 0 if λ  λG. Consequently, facts
subsuming the goal and hence concluding the proof are activated immediately. Based on
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extensive experiments with Hˆcδ,cw , we shall focus on Hˆ2,1 and Hˆ0,1 in all the experiments
described below. (See Fuchs (1997c) or Fuchs (1996b) for details.)
Hˆcδ,cw is quite a successful heuristic in particular when taking into account the compo-
nent δ reasonably (e.g. cδ = 2, cw = 1). We use Hˆcδ,cw as the standard heuristic required
by fr, i.e. frP(λ) = (distP(λ)+p) · Hˆcδ,cw(λ). Here, we always set the coefficients cδ = 0
and cw = 1, thus ignoring the level. The reason for this is that basically both distP and δ
penalize depth which may entail an unprofitable “double penalty”. Extensive experi-
ments described by Fuchs (1997c) sustain this judgement. Based on these experiments
the remaining parameters of fr are set as follows: p = 20, q1 = 0.75, q2 = 0.25, q = 0.
This choice does of course not always entail minimal run-times. However, our experi-
ments showed that it is adequate in all cases considered, as opposed to other “extreme”
parameter settings such as p = 0, q1 = 0, q2 = 0.25, and q = 0, which are highly sensitive
in the sense that they allow for shortest run-times in some cases, but fail to produce
a proof before time-out in other cases. Thus, the parameter setting we choose here is
not tailored to suit the problems we are going to tackle in the following, but appears to
exhibit an acceptable performance in general. (The adequacy of the parameter setting
might vary with the calculus at hand, but so far both for condensed detachment and for
equational reasoning the same parameter setting proved useful.)
5.2. experimental results for schema usage
We examined schema usage, i.e. fr, in the light of problems LCL040-1 through
LCL072-1 (Problems 1–33 in McCune and Wos, 1992) and problems LCL109-1 through
LCL116-1 (Problems 55–62 in McCune and Wos, 1992). These problems have the prop-
erty emphasized in the preceding subsection which is important for learning, namely to
offer a varying degree of difficulty that ranges from rather simple to challenging. A general
discussion of this issue is given in Section 6 to clarify why we chose these problems.
The problems are a part of the public TPTP problem library (Sutcliffe et al., 1994)
version 1.2.1. Note that the problems in the TPTP are given in clause normal form
(CNF), a form suitable for resolution-based or tableau-oriented theorem provers. The
CNF “encoding” of problems of CD is not needed for CoDe. The performance of Hˆcδ,cw
with respect to a number of problems, including the problems above, for various settings
of the parameters cδ and cw was thoroughly investigated in Fuchs (1997c) (see also Fuchs,
1996b) and compared with the performance of the renowned theorem prover Otter
(McCune, 1994) as reported by McCune and Wos (1992). This comparison showed that
Hˆcδ,cw can control the search so well that CoDe clearly outperforms Otter even though
CoDe is inferior to Otter in terms of inferences per second.
The results presented by McCune and Wos (1992) were obtained on a SPARCsta-
tion 1+, which is slightly faster than the SPARCstation 1 used for the experiments with
CoDe at the time. By comparing these results of CoDe with the results obtained and
published by unarguably proficient users of Otter we removed any doubts as to de-
grading the performance of Otter due to poor choices regarding its parameter setting.
Note that for both Otter and CoDe the goal of the experimental studies was not to
find very problem-specific parameter settings to solve the respective problems as fast as
possible, but to demonstrate how well the respective ATP performs given a small number
of “general-purpose” strategies or heuristics.
Recently, theorem prover competitions have shown that other provers have caught up
with and surpassed Otter. Although Otter still is a valuable tool in many domains,
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Table 1. Schema origin.
Schema Problem Heuristic Run-time
P045 LCL045-1 Hˆ2,1 28 s
P058 LCL058-1 Hˆ0,1 25 s
P060 LCL060-1 Hˆ0,1 26 s
P064 LCL064-1 Hˆ2,1 6 s
P067 LCL067-1 Hˆ2,1 4 s
P069 LCL069-1 Hˆ2,1 1 s
P070 LCL070-1 Hˆ2,1 3 s
P072 LCL072-1 Hˆ2,1 1 s
P113 LCL113-1 Hˆ2,1 3 s
and in particular in the domain of logic calculi, in the CASC-15 competition (Sutcliffe,
1998) the ATP Gandalf proved to be a strong competitor in that domain. However, on
a SPARC Ultra 170—the same type of machine was used for CASC-15—CoDe came
in second for only one of the eight LCL problems it can handle among those problems
that were a part of CASC-15 (18 s vs. Gandalf ’s 5.1 s for problem LCL093-1), despite
the fact that CoDe simply used Hˆ2,1 for all problems. (LCL093-1 can be solved in 3 s if
Hˆ0,1 is employed. CoDe proved LCL018-1 with Hˆ2,1 within 6 s, whereas Otter required
125.7 s and Gandalf exceeded the time limit.)
Given this experimental data, CoDe can be considered a state-of-the-art prover for
problems of CD. Therefore, it is not easy at all for fr to improve on Hˆcδ,cw . In other words,
the gains achieved by fr are not due to improvements on a weak system, but rather are an
advance of the state-of-the-art. For our experiments with fr we only consider problems
among those listed above that CoDe has difficulties solving when employing Hˆcδ,cw .
In the following we shall examine the three interesting cases regarding the axiomatiza-
tions and the goals of target and source problems AT = (AxT , λT ) and AS = (AxS , λS):
(1) The same axiomatization (AxT = AxS), but different goals (i.e. λS 6λT , λT 6λS);
(2) Different axiomatizations (AxT and AxS may share some axioms, but it is not the
case that one axiomatization is part of the other), but the same goal (λS  λT );
(3) Different axiomatizations and different goals;
We omit the fourth case “the same axiomatization and the same goal” because then full
re-enactment is possible and always succeeds in a negligible period of time. Note that
only for Case 1 it is sound to add schema facts as lemmas to AxT (cp. Subsection 3.3).
Therefore, we shall consider this possibility only for Case 1.
The following three subsections investigate the performance of fr for cases 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. Table 1 shows the schemas that will be utilized and how they were obtained.
For instance, schema P045 was produced according to the method given in Section 2
using the search protocol stemming from the search for a proof of LCL045-1. The search
conducted by CoDe was guided by Hˆ2,1 and successfully terminated after 28 seconds,
which is the approximate CPU time on a SPARCstation 10. The run-times listed in
Table 1 indicate that it is fairly easy to generate these schemas.
Note that schema selection is not an issue at this point. (See Subsection 5.3 instead.)
However, the performance of frP depends on the specific schema P at hand. Different
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Table 2. Case 1: The same axiomatization and different goals.
Target Schema P frP FFU SFU Lemmas Lemmas∗ Hˆ∗
LCL054-1 P060 140 s (1093) 90% 95% 230 s (1451) 250 s (1523) —
LCL058-1 P060 23 s (519) 89% 100% — 5 s (362) 25 s (710)
LCL060-1 P058 8 s (328) 95% 93% — 12 s (533) 26 s (733)
P067 4 s (227) 72% 95% 2 s (193) 2 s (225)LCL068-1 P069 20 s (629) 77% 100% — — 68 s (982)
P070 4 s (235) 75% 94% — 3 s (230)LCL071-1 P072 7 s (366) 58% 100% — 3 s (254) —
LCL114-1 P113 3 s (234) 83% 91% 12 s (513) 10 s (482) —
LCL116-1 P113 5 s (314) 78% 95% 14 s (541) 10 s (492 ) —
schemas can be created simply by employing different search-guiding heuristics during
the search for a proof of the same problem.
case 1: same axiomatization, different goals
Table 2 displays our experiments concerning Case 1. The first two columns list target
problems and schemas, respectively. The results of fr for the respective target problem
and schema are given in the third column. The entries show run-time (approximate CPU
time in seconds obtained on a SPARCstation 10) and the number of activation steps (i.e.
the length of the search protocol) in parentheses. This number gives us a rough idea of
the search effort. Note that we applied fr to target problem LCL071-1 using the two
schemas P070 and P072. Similarly, we applied fr to LCL068-1 using P067 and P069.
Column “FFU” shows the “focus fact usage”, i.e. the share relevant focus facts have of
the target proof, given as an approximate percentage. Column “SFU” shows the “schema
fact usage”, i.e. the percentage of facts of the respective schema that account for relevant
focus facts in the target proof. Hence this value gives us an idea of how many schema
facts proved useful for finding the target proof. Consider, for instance, target problem
LCL071-1 and schema P070. The target proof consists of 20 facts. Fifteen of the 20 facts
are focus facts. Hence, FFU is 15/20 = 75%. These 15 relevant focus facts go back to
15 schema facts. Since 16 facts constitute schema P070, in other words |P070| = 16, SFU
is 15/16 ≈ 94%.
The values of SFU listed in Table 2 indicate that it is important that SFU is rather
high. Given Case 1 this is understandable considering that the share 100% minus SFU
of schema facts will definitely give rise to irrelevant focus facts that may disarrange the
search. Large values of FFU indicate that a large part of the target proof goes back to
re-enactment and hence could be found rather efficiently.
When adding schema facts as lemmas to the axiomatization of the target problem,
CoDe employed Hˆ2,1 to guide the search. The results of utilizing lemmas in this manner
are listed in column “Lemmas”. The entries again show run-time and length of the search
protocol. The entry “—” signifies that no proof was found within one hour.
A slight modification of lemma usage is to assign the weight 0 to all axioms including
added lemmas so that they are immediately activated. Column “lemmas∗” shows that this
modification is crucial in order to make adding lemmas competitive. The improvements
are understandable because we can thus coerce re-enactment and hence simulate the
obviously profitable re-enactment part of fr. None the less, Table 2 does not reveal any
significant advantage of adding lemmas compared to fr. As a matter of fact, adding
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Table 3. Case 2: different axiomatizations and the same goal.
Target Schema P frP FFU SFU Hˆ∗
LCL054-1 P042 2 s (169) 50% 95% —
LCL058-1 P045 4 s (290) 23% 82% 25 s (710)
LCL045-1 P058 <1 s (69) 95% 51% 28 s (670)
lemmas can cause a failure when fr still succeeds (cp. target LCL068-1, schema P069).
An opposite observation (failure of fr, success of adding lemmas) has so far not been
made. This leads us to conclude that the “hierarchical” search induced by the distance
measure distP is pivotal. Note, however, that the component δ of Hˆ—which is switched
off for fr—also allows for taking into account distance or depth, but in a much cruder
way than distP does. Basically, the ancestor with maximal depth determines the depth
of a descendant. The depth of the other ancestor has no effect.
The last column of Table 2 lists the results of Hˆ as a point of reference. (Recall that the
selected problems are the ones that cause difficulties for Hˆ.) Hˆ∗ signifies that we employed
Hˆ2,1 or Hˆ0,1, whichever allowed CoDe to find a proof most quickly. The experiments
documented by Table 2 show that fr enables CoDe to prove problems quite fast which
it could not handle with Hˆcδ,cw and one of the two mentioned parameter settings. (There
is, however, a very problem-specific parameter setting for problem LCL071-1 that makes
it possible to prove LCL071-1 with Hˆcδ,cw . See Fuchs (1997c).) Note that fr incurs
additional computational effort compared to Hˆ due to the subsumption tests that need to
be executed in order to identify focus facts. For that reason, frP060 does not significantly
improve on Hˆ∗ with respect to LCL058-1 in terms of proof time although the number of
activation steps is clearly smaller (519 for frP060 as opposed to 710 for Hˆ∗).
Figure 3 displays the proof of LCL114-1 found by fr using schema P113 as a typical
example of Case 1. The proof listing shows from left to right the number of the activation
step, the number of the proof step, the ancestors in brackets, given as numbers referring
to previous proof steps or a blank space for axioms, and the facts themselves. Focus facts
are marked by “?”. The identical axiomatizations of target and source make it possible
that a large initial part of the target proof (FFU = 20/24 ≈ 83%) consists of focus facts.
This part also constitutes the main part of the schema (SFU = 20/22 ≈ 91%) and is
found very efficiently with only four redundant activations. Three of the four non-focus
facts necessary to conclude the proof can be considered to be “in the neighbourhood” of
the source proof since they have at least one ancestor that is a focus fact. The final proof
step is no difficulty since a fact subsuming the goal is given the weight 0 and is therefore
activated immediately (cf. Subsection 5.1).
case 2: different axiomatizations, same goal
Our experiments regarding Case 2 are summarized by Table 3. Table 3 is organized like
Table 2 without the columns concerning lemmas since the soundness of adding lemmas
is—as mentioned earlier—not guaranteed for Case 2. As a matter of fact, for Case 2
adding lemmas is completely pointless since the goal itself would be added as a lemma.
In Table 3 we make use of schema P042 not listed in Table 1. Schema P042 is obtained
by proving LCL042-1 with frP060 (cf. Table 4) which points out the potential for boot-
strapping (see also Fuchs and Fuchs, 1997a, or Denzinger et al., 1997). Bootstrapping,
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? 1 1 i(x, i(y, x))
? 2 2 [ 1 , 1 ] i(x, i(y, i(z, y)))
? 3 3 i(i(n(x), n(y)), i(y, x))
? 4 4 i(i(x, y), i(i(y, z), i(x, z)))
? 5 5 [ 4 , 1 ] i(i(i(x, y), z), i(y, z))
? 6 6 [ 5 , 3 ] i(n(x), i(x, y))
? 7 7 [ 4 , 6 ] i(i(i(x, y), z), i(n(x), z))
? 8 8 i(i(i(x, y), y), i(i(y, x), x))
? 9 9 [ 5 , 8 ] i(x, i(i(x, y), y))
? 10 10 [ 8 , 2 ] i(i(i(x, i(y, x)), z), z)
? 12 11 [ 4 , 9 ] i(i(i(i(x, y), y), z), i(x, z))
? 15 12 [ 4 , 3 ] i(i(i(x, y), z), i(i(n(y), n(x)), z))
? 16 13 [ 12 , 10 ] i(i(n(x), n(i(y, i(z, y)))), x)
? 17 14 [ 7 , 13 ] i(n(n(x)), x)
? 18 15 [ 3 , 14 ] i(x, n(n(x)))
? 19 16 [ 9 , 3 ] i(i(i(i(n(x), n(y)), i(y, x)), z), z)
? 21 17 [ 4 , 4 ] i(i(i(i(x, y), i(z, y)), u), i(i(z, x), u))
? 22 18 [ 11 , 17 ] i(i(x, y), i(i(z, x), i(z, y)))
? 23 19 [ 18 , 15 ] i(i(x, y), i(x, n(n(y))))
? 24 20 [ 17 , 16 ] i(i(x, i(n(y), n(z))), i(x, i(z, y)))
58 21 [ 4 , 14 ] i(i(x, y), i(n(n(x)), y))
148 22 [ 20 , 21 ] i(i(x, n(y)), i(y, n(x)))
233 23 [ 4 , 19 ] i(i(i(x, n(n(y))), z), i(i(x, y), z))
234 24 [ 23 , 22 ] i(i(x, y), i(n(y), n(x)))
Figure 3. Proof of LCL114-1 found by fr when using schema P113 as an example for Case 1. “?” marks
focus facts. See text for details on the proof listing.
however, is not necessary since LCL054-1 can be solved with frP060 (cp. Table 2). The
issue of bootstrapping or “hierarchical problem solving” will be addressed in more detail
in Section 5.3.
The results in Table 3, in particular with respect to target problem LCL054-1, again
demonstrate the utility of fr. Please note that LCL054-1 is a hard problem both CoDe
and Otter (cp. McCune and Wos, 1992, Problem 15) have tremendous difficulties with
when using “conventional” heuristics (i.e. Hˆ in the case of CoDe). Figure 4 reveals that
fr can succeed even if the target proof contains relatively few focus facts (FFU = 21/42 =
50%). None the less, the majority of facts constituting schema P042 (SFU = 21/22 ≈ 95%)
contribute to the proof of LCL054-1 found by fr, thus keeping the number of irrelevant
focus facts small. In situations like this, the search conducted by fr is at first mainly
guided by Hˆ0,1 as an integral part of fr. This is because different axiomatizations usually
only allow for re-enacting very small parts of the source proof. (The fact that all axioms of
LCL054-1 are focus facts merely indicates that they occur in schema P042. This does not
signify that the axioms of LCL054-1 are contained by the axiomatization of LCL042-1.)
The “trace” of the source proof can be picked up to a certain extent later on when more
and more focus facts appear.
Figure 4 is a perfect example for the flexibility of fr stemming from the integration
of Hˆ0,1 that here basically prepares the ground for re-enactment. This is kind of opposite
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? 1 1 i(i(n(x), x), x)
? 2 2 i(x, i(n(x), y))
? 3 3 i(i(x, y), i(i(y, z), i(x, z)))
? 4 4 [ 3 , 3 ] i(i(i(i(x, y), i(z, y)), u), i(i(z, x), u))
7 5 [ 3 , 2 ] i(i(i(n(x), y), z), i(x, z))
? 8 6 [ 5 , 1 ] i(x, x)
9 7 [ 2 , 6 ] i(n(i(x, x)), y)
10 8 [ 3 , 1 ] i(i(x, y), i(i(n(x), x), y))
15 9 [ 4 , 5 ] i(i(x, n(y)), i(y, i(x, z)))
16 10 [ 9 , 7 ] i(x, i(n(i(y, y)), z))
17 11 [ 5 , 9 ] i(x, i(y, i(n(x), z)))
20 12 [ 4 , 4 ] i(i(x, i(y, z)), i(i(u, y), i(x, i(u, z))))
44 13 [ 3 , 4 ] i(i(i(i(x, y), z), u), i(i(i(i(y, v), i(x, v)), z), u))
47 14 [ 3 , 10 ] i(i(i(n(i(x, x)), y), z), i(u, z))
? 48 15 [ 14 , 1 ] i(x, i(y, y))
50 16 [ 3 , 15 ] i(i(i(x, x), y), i(z, y))
53 17 [ 16 , 8 ] i(x, i(i(n(y), y), y))
90 18 [ 3 , 17 ] i(i(i(i(n(x), x), x), y), i(z, y))
96 19 [ 3 , 11 ] i(i(i(x, i(n(y), z)), u), i(y, u))
99 20 [ 4 , 18 ] i(i(x, i(n(y), y)), i(z, i(x, y)))
100 21 [ 19 , 20 ] i(x, i(y, i(z, x)))
101 22 [ 20 , 21 ] i(x, i(y, i(z, y)))
? 102 23 [ 22 , 22 ] i(x, i(y, x))
104 24 [ 3 , 23 ] i(i(i(x, y), z), i(y, z))
148 25 [ 13 , 24 ] i(i(i(i(x, y), i(z, y)), u), i(x, u))
149 26 [ 25 , 20 ] i(x, i(y, i(i(x, z), z)))
151 27 [ 20 , 26 ] i(x, i(y, i(i(y, z), z)))
152 28 [ 27 , 6 ] i(x, i(i(x, y), y))
? 153 29 [ 12 , 28 ] i(i(x, i(y, z)), i(y, i(x, z)))
? 154 30 [ 29 , 2 ] i(n(x), i(x, y))
? 155 31 [ 29 , 3 ] i(i(x, y), i(i(z, x), i(z, y)))
? 156 32 [ 31 , 1 ] i(i(x, i(n(y), y)), i(x, y))
? 157 33 [ 4 , 32 ] i(i(n(x), y), i(i(y, x), x))
? 158 34 [ 33 , 30 ] i(i(i(x, y), x), x)
? 159 35 [ 31 , 34 ] i(i(x, i(i(y, z), y)), i(x, y))
? 160 36 [ 4 , 35 ] i(i(i(x, y), z), i(i(z, x), x))
? 161 37 [ 4 , 36 ] i(i(x, y), i(i(i(x, z), y), y))
? 162 38 [ 29 , 37 ] i(i(i(x, y), z), i(i(x, z), z))
? 165 39 [ 4 , 38 ] i(i(x, y), i(i(y, i(x, z)), i(x, z)))
? 166 40 [ 29 , 39 ] i(i(x, i(y, z)), i(i(y, x), i(y, z)))
? 168 41 [ 3 , 29 ] i(i(i(x, i(y, z)), u), i(i(y, i(x, z)), u))
? 169 42 [ 41 , 40 ] i(i(x, i(y, z)), i(i(x, y), i(x, z)))
Figure 4. Proof of LCL054-1 found by fr using schema P042 as an example for Case 2. “?” marks focus
facts. See text for details on the proof listing.
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Table 4. Case 3: different axiomatizations and different goals.
Target Schema P frP FFU SFU Hˆ∗
LCL040-1 P064 1 s (68) 86% 86% —
P058 — — —LCL042-1 P060 140 s (1090) 82% 46% —
LCL045-1 P060 22 s (516) 76% 41% 28 s (670)
LCL058-1 P042 11 s (404) 40% 82% 25 s (710)
LCL060-1 P045 6 s (316) 24% 91% 26 s (733)
to the situation in Figure 3 where Hˆ0,1 together with the preference of descendants
account for concluding the proof while the groundwork is done by re-enactment.
case 3: different axiomatizations and different goals
Table 4 lists our experimental results regarding Case 3. Table 4 is organized like Table 3
since it is again not sound to add schema facts as lemmas due to different axiomatizations
of source and target problems. As before, the capabilities of fr go beyond mere speed-
ups. Table 4 shows that besides problem LCL040-1 problem LCL042-1 can now be solved
which provides us with schema P042 that is useful for proving LCL054-1 (see above).
Please note that similar to LCL054-1, LCL042-1 is a rather hard problem that CoDe
cannot solve with Hˆ. Also, McCune and Wos (1992) show that Otter has to spend
considerable computational effort to deal with LCL042-1 (Problem 3 in McCune and
Wos, 1992).
Finally, the results concerning problems LCL042-1 and LCL058-1 in different roles as
source and target problems (cp. Table 4) reveal that, quite expectedly, fr is not “sym-
metric”. That is, a proof of a problem A found by fr when using a schema originating
from a source problem B does not guarantee to find a proof of B when using a schema
stemming from A. Note that SFU regarding target LCL042-1 and schema P060 is a quite
low 46% which indicates that we might be close to the limit of what fr can still handle
in this particular case. When using schema P058, this limit appears to be exceeded.
5.3. experimental results for schema selection
We empirically evaluated the utility of the similarity criteria and the resulting ordering
for source problems developed in Section 4 with the help of problems LCL040-1 through
LCL072-1. First, we tried to prove each problem using Hˆ2,1 and—if Hˆ2,1 failed—Hˆ0,1.
A proof attempt was considered a failure if no proof was found within 60 seconds. After
this “first round” involving only heuristics Hˆ2,1 and Hˆ0,1, the following seven problems
remained unsolved: LCL040-1, LCL042-1, LCL054-1, LCL061-1, LCL062-1, LCL063-1,
and LCL068-1. Note that except for problem LCL068-1, none of these problems can be
solved with Hˆ2,1 or Hˆ0,1 even when allowing CoDe to search for one hour. The other
26 problems were proved and consequently could be employed as source problems and
the associated schemas could be used by fr.
When given a so far unsolved problem AT , AT was employed to identify the most
similar source problem among all available (initially 26) source problems. The parameters
of the similarity measure sim (see Definition 4.3) were c1 = 3 and c2 = 2, and the
threshold concerning the minimal similarity requirement wasm = 0.99. In our experiment
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AT was always able to identify exactly one most similar source problem.† The associated
schema was then used by fr. If fr succeeded before exceeding its time-out of 5 minutes,
the now solved problemAT also became a source problem. In our experiments, AT chose
appropriate source problems and thus schemas that allowed CoDe to prove LCL040-1,
LCL042-1, LCL054-1, and LCL068-1 with the help of fr. The still unsolved problem
LCL063-1 has so far never been proved by CoDe. (As a matter of fact we are not aware
of any automated proof of this problem.) Problem LCL061-1 can be proved if fr is
upgraded using a learning technique based on features (Fuchs, 1996a). The important
observation here is that LCL061−1 picked the appropriate source problem LCL054-1. Once
LCL061-1 is solved, LCL062-1 is rather trivial for fr using the schema associated with
LCL061-1 which LCL062−1 has no difficulty selecting.
The experiment described above outlines the procedure for bootstrapping or hierar-
chical problem solving. This procedure can be considered a saturation process conducted
in rounds. The first round involves the conventional heuristic Hˆ which provides a basis
of proof experience. In each further round fr makes use of a schema stemming from one
of the source proofs obtained in previous rounds to solve a problem AT that has not yet
been solved. The schema to be used by fr is selected with the help of the ordering AT .
Problems that can be solved are added to the database of proof experience. This process
stops as soon as there is a round during which no problem is solved. This mechanism
enables fr and AT to work together to gradually solve ever harder problems without
any further assistance.
In summary, the experiments demonstrated that the certainly merely heuristic similar-
ity assessment realized by AT is useful and produces encouraging results. This observa-
tion was also made in studies involving a distributed proof environment (Denzinger et al.,
1997) and case-based reasoning (Fuchs and Fuchs, 1997a). We want to emphasize that,
besides for logic calculi, also for equational reasoning (Denzinger et al., 1997) excellent
empirical results were obtained. Nevertheless we acknowledge the fact that the area of
schema selection deserves further studies.
6. Discussion
We presented an approach to utilizing schemas for bottom-up automated theorem prov-
ing and addressed in this context the three major components of schema-based learning,
namely schema design, schema usage, and schema selection. The first component essen-
tially corresponds to proof extraction. The resulting schema is a set of formulas or facts
constituting a proof that is also referred to as a source proof.
The method for schema usage is called flexible re-enactment (fr). It exploits past proof
experience with heuristic means. When searching for the proof of a given proof problem,
fr attempts to re-enact a given source proof (schema) by searching for the facts that
occur in the schema. A fact that appears during the search and corresponds to a fact of
the schema is referred to as a focus fact . Flexibility is achieved by also searching in the
“neighbourhood” of the source proof, i.e. by also preferring descendants of focus facts
which represent the re-enacted source proof or a part thereof.
Machine learning has many aspects, and there is no “hard and fast” definition of
machine learning as to which approaches can be termed learning approaches. Certainly,
one aspect of learning is to make use of experience acquired during past problem-solving
†For this experiment the time required to select the most similar source problem was negligible.
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attempts to improve the problem-solving capabilities. Based on this view, making use of
experience in the form of schemas or source proofs, as it is done by fr, can be considered a
kind of learning. Consequently fr can be considered a learning approach, even if pivotal
parameters like the schema to be used are provided by the user. This is similar to a
human student who solved a certain problem and is then told by a teacher to use that
expertise to tackle another related problem. It is of course desirable that the student can
determine an appropriate “source” by himself, which in the context of schemas leads us
to the topic of schema selection.
Schema selection is in general a crucial issue. It needs to take into account how schema
usage proceeds in order to select useful schemas. In the context of a heuristic use of
schemas, it is sufficient to devise heuristic similarity criteria. These criteria should be
very likely to cause the selection of schemas that entail a search bias which is useful for
proving a given target problem. The criteria described in this article include a measure
for the overlap of axiomatizations and a rather coarse measure for the similarity of goals.
Our encouraging experimental results demonstrated their appropriateness.
We want to point out that several implementations of this schema approach exist and
that numerous experiments have demonstrated its potential. In particular, it is not only
possible to achieve significant speed-ups, but also to solve problems that could not be
handled before with “conventional” heuristics. Generally, fr can be employed for all types
of bottom-up reasoning ATPs. Its basic requirements are that a schema or source proof
essentially is a set of formulas, and that there is a clear notion of subsumption. These
requirements are typically satisfied by first-order bottom-up reasoning ATPs. Thus, fr
can be applied to resolution-based ATPs and equational reasoning systems (Denzinger
et al., 1997), for instance. There seems to be no apparent reason why fr might not
be applicable to bottom-up higher-order theorem proving as long as there is a useful
definition of subsumption. Given the prevalence of interactive theorem proving in the
context of higher-order logics, however, there currently appears to be little opportunity—
or in a sense even the necessity, considering that fr is designed for automated theorem
proving—to verify this judgement.
We chose to demonstrate fr in the light of condensed detachment—an admittedly
simple logic calculus, which none the less exhibits the central characteristics of bottom-
up reasoning and provides difficult search problems—mainly for the following reason.
Human learning is characterized by gradually improving one’s capabilities by utilizing in
some way the experience gained while solving more and more difficult problems. These
problems need to be related to facilitate the exploitation of experience. Such a didactic
presentation or availability of problems is indispensable for machine-learning methods
such as fr. Obviously, the way a machine-learning approach can exploit previous expe-
rience is narrow and restricted compared to the array of possibilities a human student
has. Therefore, the demands on the didactic arrangement are even stronger in connection
with machine learning than they are for human learning.
The design of the TPTP as a large collection of problems, however, does not take into
account the needs of learning approaches. As a matter of fact, it probably is not feasible
to do so, since different learning methods usually require different didactic arrangements
of problems. Consequently, there are rather few TPTP domains that allow for sensi-
bly testing approaches such as fr. The problems of condensed detachment selected for
our experiments satisfy the criteria for a meaningful experimental study, namely to be
sufficiently related and to be increasingly difficult to provide a serious challenge. These
characteristics paired with the simplicity of the calculus as such, making it possible to
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present it concisely without having to resort to possibly distracting technical details,
were the main motivation for using the experimental set-up we have chosen.
Heuristics exploiting past experience such as fr are heuristics with a “special” param-
eter “source proof”. Much like conventional heuristics, it can be expected that there is
a number of problems for which fr works well depending on the appropriateness of the
chosen parameters, in particular the source proof, but fr may have a poor performance
on other problems. Learning approaches make use of the source proof or several source
proofs in a certain way which determines the problems they are useful for. Thus, differ-
ent approaches tend to have different strengths and weaknesses, and it is neither fair nor
sensible to declare one approach to be better or worse based on it being better or worse
with respect to certain problems.
We have shown that fr is suitable if the formulas inferred for the source proof consti-
tute a substantial part of a target proof. Other approaches exploit other relationships.
Feature-based approaches (e.g. Fuchs, 1998; Fuchs and Fuchs, 1998) utilize similarities
of source and target proof on an abstract feature level by representing deduced formu-
las with feature vectors, whereas analogy-based methods (e.g. Kolbe and Walther, 1994;
Melis, 1995) exploit schemas in the form of proof structures and patterns as they can be
found in particular in inductive theorem proving. All these methods have their own mer-
its and shortcomings. Generally, if the relationship between source and target problem
is of a kind that cannot be exploited by a given method, then it will usually not perform
well. For instance, analogy-based or planning-style methods are at a loss in unstructured
domains such as logic calculi, whereas fr is pointless if there is no target proof that
shares enough formulas with a given source proof. In summary, each learning method
has an “application niche” for which it is most suitable. Ideally, different learning meth-
ods occupy different, slightly overlapping, niches. In this article we have dealt with the
niche occupied by fr. We recognize the fact that future work in the area of learning and
automated theorem proving must address the problem of identifying the right method
for the application niche one is interested in.
fr is not limited to the use of a schema stemming from just one proof. In the context
of fr, a schema is a set of facts on which the search focuses. In principle, such a schema
can originate from one proof or from several proofs. Obviously, if a schema consists of
several proofs, we cannot consider a schema to be synonymous to a proof anymore as we
have done throughout this article, but we have to view a schema as a collection of proofs.
The use of a schema uniting information on several proofs has certain advantages and
disadvantages. On the one hand, exploiting a pool of proof experiences rather than one
piece has certain benefits: it considerably alleviates the difficulty of schema selection
and it undoubtedly increases the chance of having available the “right” focus facts. As
a matter of fact, it is conceivable that there is no single source proof available which
consists of all the facts necessary to sufficiently bias the search conducted by fr, whereas
a combination of two or more available source proofs may be able to achieve that. On
the other hand, however, redundant search effort due to too many irrelevant focus facts
might become a problem that outweighs possible advantages. In other words, the ability
of fr to focus on a certain area of the search space is diluted and may eventually be lost
if a schema comprises too many proofs, in particular if these proofs significantly differ
from each other. Hence there is a trade-off, and future work has to examine under which
circumstances the usage of a schema containing several proofs can be profitable.
fr can of course also be employed for proof checking and proof completion. Proof
checking essentially corresponds to plain re-enactment without search. Proof completion
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means that the given schema facts (i.e. the facts occurring in the schema) represent the
“skeleton” of a source proof with a few intermediate steps missing. (In this context the
schema may be considered “incomplete”.) Under these conditions the schema facts will
give rise only to relevant focus facts. Thus, fr can search for the missing intermediate
steps without being confused and possibly misguided by irrelevant focus facts which
makes things easier than in general applications of fr.
In Veroff (1996) the hints strategy (HS) has been investigated as to its usefulness for
proof checking, proof completion, and also for proof search. Hints basically are the coun-
terparts of schema facts. HS and fr have commonalities, but also have different features
and design concepts. In order to search for or complete a proof with certain properties,
HS also allows for avoiding instead of focusing on hints—a feature that was not an objec-
tive when designing fr. However, when it comes to searching for a target proof without
such constraints, fr subsumes HS in particular because of its ability to deal sensibly with
non-focus facts that are descendants of focus facts, thus exploiting a source proof beyond
mere re-enactment—a concept not present in HS.
Finally, we want to point out that fr exhibits the main characteristics of explanation-
based learning (Ellman, 1989), namely analytic learning embodied by extracting the
source proof, thus producing a schema, generalization by using subsumption to identify
focus facts, and the use of a single example which corresponds to the use of a single
schema.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) while the
author was at the University of Kaiserslautern, Germany.
References
Bachmair, L., Dershowitz, N., Plaisted, D. (1989). Completion without failure. In Colloquium on the
Resolution of Equations in Algebraic Structures. Academic Press.
Brock, B., Cooper, S., Pierce, W. (1988). Analogical reasoning and proof discovery. In Proceedings of the
Ninth Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-9), LNCS 310, pp. 454–468. Berlin, Springer.
Chang, C. L., Lee, R. C. (1973). Symbolic Logic and Mechanical Theorem Proving. Academic Press.
Denzinger, J., Fuchs, Marc, Fuchs, M. (1997). High performance ATP systems by combining several AI
methods. In Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-
97), pp. 102–107. California, San Fransisco, Morgan Kaufmann.
Denzinger, J., Schulz, S. (1996a). Learning domain knowledge to improve theorem proving. In Proceedings
of the 13th Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-13), LNAI 1104, pp. 62–76. Berlin, Springer.
Denzinger, J., Schulz, S. (1996b). Recording and analyzing knowledge-based distributed deduction pro-
cesses. J. Symb. Comput., 21, 523–541.
Ellman, T. (1989). Explanation-based learning: a survey of programs and perspectives. ACM Comput.
Surv., 21, 163–221.
Fuchs, M. (1995). Learning proof heuristics by adapting parameters. In Prieditis, A., Russell, S. eds, Ma-
chine Learning: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference (ML-95), pp. 235–243. California,
San Fransisco, Morgan Kaufmann.
Fuchs, M. (1996a). Experiments in the heuristic use of past proof experience. In Proceedings of the 13th
Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-13), LNAI 1104, pp. 523–537. Berlin, Springer.
Fuchs, M. (1996b). Powerful search heuristics based on weighted symbols, level and features. In Stewman,
John, H. eds, Proceedings of the Ninth Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Symposium (FLAIRS-
96), pp. 449–453. Florida AI Research Society. ISBN 0-9620-1738-8.
Fuchs, M. (1997a). Flexible proof replay with heuristics. In Proceedings of the Eighth Portuguese Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence (EPIA-97), LNAI 1323, pp. 1–12. Berlin, Springer.
Fuchs, M. (1997b). Flexible re-enactment of proofs. In Proceedings of the Eighth Portuguese Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (EPIA-97), LNAI 1323, pp. 13–24. Berlin, Springer.
Proofs as Schemas and Their Heuristic Use 61
Fuchs, M. (1997c). Learning search heuristics for automated deduction. Ph.D. Dissertation, Ver-
lag Dr. Kovacˇ, Hamburg. ISBN 3-86064-623-0.
Fuchs, M. (1998). A feature-based learning method for theorem proving. In Proceedings of the 15th
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-98), pp. 457–462. AAAI Press.
Fuchs, Marc, Fuchs, M. (1997a). Applying case-based reasoning to automated deduction. In Proceedings
of the Second International Conference on Case-based Reasoning (ICCBR-97), LNAI 1266, pp. 23–
32. Berlin, Springer.
Fuchs, D., Fuchs, M. (1997b). CODE: A powerful prover for problems of condensed detachment. In
Proceedings of the 14th Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-14), LNAI 1249, pp. 260–263.
Berlin, Springer.
Fuchs, Marc, Fuchs, M. (1998). Feature-based learning of search-guiding heuristics for theorem proving.
AI Commun., 11, 175–189.
Kolbe, T., Walther, C. (1994). Reusing proofs. In Proceedings of the 11th European Conference on AI
(ECAI-94), pp. 80–84.
Kolbe, T., Walther, C. (1995). Patching proofs for reuse. In Proceedings of the Eighth European Con-
ference on Machine Learning (ECML-95), LNCS 912, pp. 303–306. Berlin, Springer.
 Lukasiewicz, J. (1970). Selected Works. Amsterdam, North-Holland.
McCune, W. (1994). OTTER 3.0 reference manual and guide. Technical Report ANL-94/6, Argonne
Natl. Laboratory.
McCune, W., Wos, L. (1992). Experiments in automated deduction with condensed detachment. In
Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-11), LNAI 607, pp. 209–223.
Berlin, Springer.
Melis, E. (1995). A model of analogy-driven proof-plan construction. In Proceedings of the 14th Inter-
national Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-95), pp. 182–189. Morgan Kaufmann.
Owen, S. (1990). Analogy for Automated Reasoning. Academic Press.
Slaney, J. (1993). SCOTT: A model-guided theorem prover. In Proceedings of the 13th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-93), pp. 109–114. Morgan Kaufmann.
Sutcliffe, G. (1998). The CADE-15 ATP system competition (CASC-15). http://www.cs.jcu.edu.
au/~tptp/CASC-15.
Sutcliffe, G., Suttner, C., Yemenis, T. (1994). The TPTP problem library. In Proceedings of the
12th Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-12), LNAI 814, pp. 252–266. Springer. See also
http://www.cs.jcu.edu.au/~tptp.
Suttner, C., Ertel, W. (1990). Automatic acquisition of search-guiding heuristics. In Proceedings of the
10th Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-10), LNAI 449, pp. 470–484. Oxford, Springer.
Tarski, A. (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press.
Veroff, R. (1996). Using hints to increase the effectiveness of an automated reasoning program: case
studies. J. Autom. Reasoning, 16, 223–239.
Wos, L. (1990). Meeting the challenge of fifty years of logic. J. Autom. Reasoning, 6, 213–232.
Wos, L. (1995). Searching for circles of pure proofs. J. Autom. Reasoning, 15, 279–315.
Originally Received 15 September 1998
Accepted 13 May 1999
